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By the numbers Jake Ryan Jersey , Jordy Nelson and Jimmy Graham have been pretty close to the same player the last two seasons. Deceiving though the stats may be, what they tell us isn’t that the Green Bay Packers made a mistake by letting Nelson go, but rather that neither player were likely good options for this offense in 2018 and beyond. We shouldn’t conflate the plan to move on from Jordy Nelson with the plan to pay Jimmy Graham. Even though they happened within mere hours of one another, featured Pro Bowl pass catchers, and were linked all year, they can’t be viewed as a singular move. They weren’t then and their repercussions on this team likewise aren’t linked moving forward as Brian Gutekunst looks to improve the Packers this offseason. When the Packers decided to move on from Nelson, even the biggest Jordy fans understood why. The pricetag was too high and his physical skills clearly waned. he wasn’t particularly useful with Brett Hundley and if one’s usefulness is tied solely to playing with Aaron Rodgers, then that player may not actually be that useful. The acrimony came when Nelson intimated he would have been open to returning at a much lower salary number, but the Packers offered what was deemed an embarrassing contract (likely the veteran minimum or something close to it) and fans coalesced behind this slight. How could Green Bay treat one of its heroes this way? This too isn’t the point, nor is it the problem. Davante Adams was clearly ready to assume the mantle of lead dog in this passing game. Geronimo Allison was leading the Packers in receiving in 2018 before an injury robbed him of his season, but he was on his way to rewarding the faith this Packers coaching staff and front office put in him. Randall Cobb came into the season in a contract year and clearly the front office had the notion of wanting to get younger, more athletic players into the stable of pass catchers. After all, they drafted three of them. And while it would be easy to say “Yeah, after they cut Nelson,” it’s likely the Packers made the Nelson move at least in part knowing they had every intention of going young, bigger, and faster in the draft. Plenty of Nelson fans and general Packer fan cynics will not be convinced by this, but the reality is Nelson wasn’t good with the Packers in 2017 (9.1 yards per catch with the lowest catch % of his career), and he wasn’t much better for the Raiders despite Oakland trading away its best pass catcher midseason. In fact, Nelson was so ineffective, Jon Gruden built the passing game around another former Green Bay castoff: Jared Cook. Even if we assume Aaron Rodgers would have been an upgrade over Derek Carr (hardly a big assumption), Nelson simply not longer possesses the physical capabilities of being a down-to-down factor for this or any good passing offense. Green Bay could not have foreseen losing two of their top three receivers for more than half a season each, and clearly did not predict the stagnation of Mike McCarthy’s offensive scheme. It’s not just possible, but likely the injuries to Allison and Cobb, as well as the loss of Nelson would have been mitigated in the hands of a more innovative offensive coach. Putting rookies in an offense where they don’t have to win isolation routes or show preternatural connection with their quarterback would have provided them better opportunities to succeed, given the estimable physical tools of guys like Equanimeous St. Brown and Marquez Valdes-Scantling. If it takes ESP to make the offense work, it might not be an offense worth trying to make work. That’s clearly the decision the front office ultimately made. Cutting down the lag time between when Rodgers got to start building a connection with these younger receivers, old offense or new, should serve as a boon for this offense moving forward. If the Packers had kept Nelson one more season, Green Bay would be staring at a season of incredible upheaval and the assimilation of myriad new weapons into an entirely new offense. The real issue with the decision to move on from Nelson wasn’t believing they were better off long-term without him, but rather deciding to overpay to replace his production with Jimmy Graham. Green Bay handed out three-year $30 million deal with more than $13 million in Year 1 going to Graham, making him the most expensive tight end in football for 2018. Some observers Lance Kendricks Color Rush Jersey , this author included, suggested given Nelson’s skillset at this point in his career, Graham could essentially replace the third down and red zone ability. Graham produced inconsistently in 2018 to put it mildly, even going so far as to admit he hasn’t done much to help the team. But when two tight ends come out this offseason and say the McCarthy offense isn’t set up for the tight end, it’s worth wondering why Gutekunst thought this was money well spent. It’s likewise possible McCarthy simply showed no interest in consistently finding ways to get Graham involved, but either way this is an unmistakable failure. He failed to show up in contested catch and adversity situations, one of the areas in which he had been stellar for much of his career thanks to a background in basketball. Graham dropped simple passes, didn’t give effort in the run game, and although he was wildly miscast by Mike McCarthy in this offense, simply didn’t come anywhere near producing at a level worthy of that money. It felt like good process at the time. The receiver market exploded with guys like Albert Wilson, Taylor Gabriel and Paul Richardson getting huge paydays, contracts they would never be able to match with on-field production. Green Bay needed someone to get open on third down and in the red zone like Nelson. They needed a good tight end. That’s what they tried to get with Graham, they just didn’t get it. Of the 53 players who saw at least 83 targets last season, no player produced fewer yards per route run than Graham, but Nelson was tied for 43rd despite being a more featured part of his team’s offense. In fact, just seven tight ends saw that many targets in their offense, including Graham and Nelson’s teammate Cook. Cook finished 26th in yards per route run, ahead of players like Stefon Diggs and Alshon Jeffery.Taking a swing on Graham was good process in some ways, but a poor outcome. They made a logical bet, just on the wrong horse. Furthermore, we must disentangle the two moves, separating the decision to move on from Nelson with the big-money move to add Graham. Though they are related, they are not one move and while one was likely the prudent choice, the other was hardly a success. What the last two seasons for these two players showed wasn’t that the Packers erred in dropping Nelson in favor of Graham; it’s believing Graham was a superior option and worth the top-of-market tight end money. This is borne out in how the Packers look to attack the 2019 offseason. They’re not looking for a boundary receiver to make catches on third downs or the red zone like Nelson. They realized they have some really talented players on the roster for that. What they need is a reliable tight end with some blocking ability who can make plays over the middle of the field. In other words, Green Bay found suitable replacements for Nelson as a receiver, but Graham failed to offer that which the team believed it was getting when he signed. That, in this exchange, represents the clear and obvious failure. Matt LaFleur’s offense should be much more tight end friendly, but it’s not at all clear the Packers want that tight end to be Graham. A scheme change should further mitigate the loss of Nelson, but likely won’t make the Graham contract look any better, leaving Gutekunst and the Packers to once again stare down a revamped tight end room. First they must look in the mirror to realize the Graham move was a mistake, one that must now be put in the rearview mirror. Sean McVay’s offense incites works like “innovative https://www.thepackersfanshop.com/Davon-House-Jersey ,” “progressive,” and even “genius,” not because his team resembles the Greatest Show on Turf, or runs some wild 2019 version of the Air Raid. In fact, the Los Angeles Rams run the ball as often as almost any other team in football. When his team squares off with the best coach of the modern era in Super Bowl LIII, they’ll attempt to score points with a passing game that only thrives because the run game creates such problems for opponents. This premise was lost on Mike McCarthy, but could come to Green Bay with Matt LaFleur. What McVay does best isn’t just call a great game, or design interesting plays, he maximizes his advantages on every snap. According to a FiveThirtyEight study, one of the key advantages in the Rams run game was running against light boxes, plays when the defense has six or fewer defenders in the box. This tracks: give your offense a numbers advantage, hand it to a really good running back, flourish. It’s a simple process right? Sort of. It’s creating that advantage which takes some work. For too long the Packers run game, much like the passing game, relied solely on the hog mollies upfront winning their matchups, the running back picking the right hole and then making a guy or two miss. Luckily for the Packers, they have a very talented stable of backs and a quality offensive line despite the wailing and gnashing of teeth over it. In other words, the running game has been good (and it’s been very good despite McCarthy refusing to commit to it) but that doesn’t mean it can’t get better with a fresher approach. Here’s how. This is a play from last season, a simple outside zone play. The Packers motion Jimmy Graham across the formation, then give to Jamaal Williams. It’s as simple as simple gets from a run play standpoint. It was going to work except that Bryan Bulaga and Marcedes Lewis, two of the most reliable blockers on the team, missed blocking the 49ers defensive end who chases Williams down from behind. Simplicity isn’t the core problem; plenty of McVay’s plays are simple are their core. This play requires perfect execution to work because that’s all it is. Go back to before this play starts. This is the front facing Green Bay: eight guys near the line of scrimmage with the Packers in a two-tight end formation. It’s four guys to block four, including Corey Linsley who is already outflanked just by alignment of the defensive tackle. Plus, Jimmy Graham has to block someone, which he does relatively well on this play but isn’t ideal strategy overall. Again, this play would have worked had they sealed the backside (two guys can’t block no one), but there’s nothing easy here. McVay established himself as the new king in the NFL at creating ease for his offense. Alignment, motion, numbers and tendency breaking help him achieve that end. This is a play we’ll almost certainly see in Green Bay as both Kyle Shanahan and Sean McVay run it. There’s the pre-snap motion from the receiver to eyes and bodies moving to the right, then the handoff back to the left on what is otherwise a simple inside zone give, and the tight end peels across the formation to seal the edge. After the ball is snapped, it’s actually a very straight forward run Bryan Bulaga Jersey , but the motion, formation, and personnel gave the Rams an enormous advantage. Before the snap, the middle of the field is already wide open. Why? Formation and personnel. With three receivers on the field, the Packers are in sub-package so not only do they have a lighter box here by number, the actual men playing are literally lighter. It’s defensive backs instead of linebackers, so even if the play isn’t blocked perfectly and the defense plays with discipline, it’s Todd Gurley 1-on-1 with a defensive back instead of a linebacker. Advantage Rams. Add in the motion and the Packers are dead here. Look at how much space the motion creates with Tramon Williams running the other direction and all the eyes of the defense on that side of the field eying Brandin Cooks coming across the formation. If Jermaine Whitehead doesn’t stay home, this is a 35-yard run instead of five. Matt LaFleur grew up in an offense running these plays. This is what he called the illusion of complexity. Give the defense something shiny to look at, while running something relatively simple at its core. It’s about creating advantages. This play from Tennessee last season illustrates this premise. It’s a simple lead zone play with the tight end as a fullback, but that distinction is crucial here. The Titans are in the same personnel grouping as the Rams in the above play with three receivers, a back and a tight end (11 personnel). That creates a size advantage with the Cowboys in sub-package defense. With the two receiver set to the non-play side, LaFleur is using both a personnel and formational advantage to create opportunities for his offense. The end zone angle shows this even more clearly. Without even having to know the play, it’s easy to see the Titans have a built-in lane exactly where they want to run the ball. This is a perfect call given the Cowboys alignment and personnel choice, but each of those are driven by the play design from LaFleur. The play ultimately isn’t blocked perfectly (the Titans Taylor Lewan almost certainly should have been called for holding) but because of all the built-in advantages, it’s a big gainer. This play in particular demonstrates LaFleur’s ability to adapt and evolve core concepts of his offense. This play is really just a lead zone play, run for hundreds of years (numbers approximate) in the NFL by coaches from the Shanahans to Gary Kubiak and even Mike McCarthy. In fact, the younger Shanahan ran it against McCarthy last season. This play was a staple for the 49ers last season and for the Falcons under Shanahan and LaFleur in Atlanta, but it doesn’t have to be run with a true fullback. This is why the 49ers paid up for Kyle Juszczyk: because he serves the role of both fullback and tight end. If there’s a case for retaining Marcedes Lewis and/or drafting a tight end who can block, this concept is it. Look at the advantage that type of player creates for the offense. On second-and-long, the Packers often went to their super-sub package, leaving them extremely vulnerable to the run game. Just by pre-snap alignment, this is stealing for San Francisco, with everyone accounted for and the closest safety 20 yards downfield. This old school concept is reborn thanks to personnel advantage, which in this case is based on the unique skills of one player, but also league tendencies to throw on second-and-long, as well as the move toward playing small at all times to combat spread offenses and passing attacks. Given how foundational the run game will be for LaFleur, expect considerable time and resources allocated to getting the ground attack back on track. The old joke about the Mike Shanahan offense was they could put just about anyone in that offense and he’d rush for 1,000 yards. His son Kyle, McVay, and now LaFleur have taken the bones of that highly productive run offense and updated them for 2018 and 2019. Making life easier for Rodgers isn’t just about revamping the passing concepts and route design; it means giving him a ground game that consistently churns out yardage and fits in the modern NFL.